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Abstract 
 
This article investigates the purpose and workings of EU competition law and policy. More specifically, 
it scrutinizes the claim that sustainable consumption and production (SCP) requires flexible rather than 
strict enforcement of Article 101 TFEU. Proponents of flexible antitrust argue that SCP requires sector-
wide private coordination since manufacturers of sustainable products suffer from first mover 
disadvantage if consumers may opt for cheaper, less sustainable products. Four main policies have been 
put forward to legitimize flexible antitrust. Building on the constitutional context, a first policy uses a 
broad welfare standard to balance competition and sustainability under Article 101(3). Based on the 
more economic approach, a second policy balances both interests under Article 101(3), provided that a 
net welfare gain is evidenced in quantitative terms. Grounded in the legitimate objective doctrine 
introduced in Wouters, a third policy balances both interests under Article 101(1). Motivated by the 
useful effect doctrine, a fourth policy aims to circumvent antitrust by allowing the government to declare 
private sector initiatives generally binding. This article questions all four policies. Based on a coherent 
integration of principle and practice, it shows that strict competition enforcement is the legitimate and 
effective way forward to achieve SCP. Problems of under-regulation are to be addressed by the 
regulatory state and require proper articulation of state policy in order to preclude antitrust 
accountability. 
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1. Introduction* 
This article addresses the purpose and workings of EU competition law and policy.1 How exactly does 
the protection of competition help to promote welfare? Do the competition rules allow for a balancing 
of competition and non-competition interests? What does objective competition enforcement actually 
entail? The test case competition rule is Article 101 TFEU. The test case welfare consideration is 
“sustainability”, a concept that links environmental protection needs to sustainable consumption and 
production (SCP). Most people agree that, in order to limit global warming, we must urgently step up 
SCP. The question however is what kind of antitrust promotes SCP best. Proponents of “green antitrust” 
claim that strict enforcement of Article 101 TFEU obstructs SCP (where “strict” implies that the 
protection of competition prevails over the promotion of sustainability). SCP would require sector-wide 
private coordination because manufacturers of more sustainable products may suffer from first mover 
disadvantage as long as consumers can opt for cheaper, less sustainable products. In order to achieve 
SCP, sector-wide coordination therefore needs to be facilitated by a more flexible approach to 
competition enforcement (where “flexible” implies that the promotion of sustainability may prevail over 
the protection of competition).2  
This article challenges the idea of flexible competition enforcement. Basically because the thought of 
competition agencies and courts balancing competition and non-competition interests in case of conflict 
does not sit well with their duty to objectively apply the law.3 The aim of the article, which is obviously 
not the first to advocate antitrust “simple and pure”,4 is to break through an ever revolving debate by 
presenting an enforcement narrative that coherently connects principle and practice. In order to do so, it 
starts from the premise that legitimate and effective enforcement is to follow logically and coherently 
from first principles. This means that the constitutional fundamentals of EU competition law are leading 
                                                     
*  Edith Loozen (PhD), Fernand Braudel senior fellow at the European University Institute, Florence, and a visiting 
researcher at Erasmus University, Rotterdam (Edith.Loozen@EUI.eu). The author thanks Heike Schweitzer, 
Marco Bronckers, Jan Kees Winters, Julian Nowag, Peter Drahos and Giorgio Monti for their helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
1  This article focuses on the EU competition rules addressing undertakings, not on the EU competition rules 
covering aids granted by states.  
2  Ch. Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy (Hart Publishing, 2009); S. Kingston, “Integrating Environmental 
Protection and EU Competition Law: Why Competition Isn’t Special”, (2010) ELJ, 780-805; Ch. Townley, 
“Which goals count in article 101 TFEU?: Public policy and its discontents”, (2011) ECLR, 441-448; A. 
Gerbrandy and R. Claassen, “Rethinking European Competition Law: From a Consumer Welfare to a 
Capability Approach”, (2016) Utrecht Law Review, 1-15; J. Nowag, Environmental Integration in Competition 
and Free Movement Laws (OUP, 2016); G. Monti and J. Mulder, “Escaping the Clutches of EU Competition 
Law”, (2017) EL Rev., 635-656; A. Gerbrandy, “Solving a Sustainability Deficit in European Competition 
Law”, (2017) World Comp., 539-562. More generally: B. van Rompuy, Economic Efficiency: The Sole 
Concern of Modern Antitrust Policy? Non-efficiency considerations under Article 101 TFEU (Wolters Kluwer, 
2012); A. Witt, “Public Policy Goals Under EU Competition Law – Now is the Time to Set the House in Order” 
(2012) European Competition Journal, 443-470.  
3  This article does not touch on the situation in which the competition and sustainability interest do not conflict. 
4  G. Amato, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power (Hart Publishing, 2012). Cf. A. Schaub and R. Dohms, “Das 
Weissbuch der Europäischen Kommission über die Modernisierung der Vorschriften zur Anwendung der 
Artikel 81 und 82 EG-Vertrag”, (1999) Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, 1055-1089; C-D. Ehlermann, “The 
Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy: A Legal and Cultural Revolution” (2000) CML Rev. 537-590; E. 
Loozen, “Professional ethics and restraints of competition” (2006) EL Rev., 29-48; O. Odudu, The Boundaries 
of Competition Law (OUP, 2006); E. Loozen, Het begrip mededingingsbeperking zoals neergelegd in artikel 
101(1) VWEU: een beslismodel (Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2010); O. Odudu, “The Wider Concerns of 
Competition Law” (2010) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 599-613; H. Hovenkamp, “Antitrust Policy And 
Inequality Of Wealth” (2017) (Oct) CPI Antitrust Chronicle, 7-13; B. Lyons, “Inequality And Competition 
Policy” (2017) (Oct) CPI Antitrust Chronicle, 32-37.  
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rather than the case law of the EU Court of Justice or competition policy as defined by the EU 
Commission. In order to discuss the main arguments put forward to legitimize flexible antitrust in a 
continuous setting, the article uses the Dutch sustainability dossier that specifies four flexibility 
policies.5,6 Building on the constitutional context of EU competition law, a first policy uses a broad 
welfare standard to balance competition and sustainability under Article 101(3) TFEU.7 Based on the 
more economic approach and endorsed by the Commission, a second policy balances both interests 
under Article 101(3) TFEU, provided that net welfare gain can be evidenced in quantitative consumer 
surplus terms (qNWG).8 Grounded in the legitimate objective doctrine introduced in Wouters,9 a third 
policy also balances both interests but under Article 101(1) TFEU.10 Motivated by the useful effect 
doctrine, a fourth policy aims to preclude competition enforcement altogether by proposing a new 
legislative approach that allows the Dutch government to declare sustainability initiatives generally 
binding.11 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes whether indeed the constitutional context of EU 
competition law allows for a broad welfare standard and pertaining prioritization of sustainability over 
competition within Article 101 TFEU. Having identified the constitutional fundamentals of EU antitrust, 
those fundamentals then provide the basis for analyzing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the other 
flexibility policies. Section 3 investigates whether the more economic approach can actually serve for 
competition agencies to use qNWG as a baseline for legal interpretation of the indispensability and 
residual competition conditions laid down in Article 101(3) TFEU. Section 4 subsequently addresses 
the workings of the legitimate objective doctrine by revisiting Wouters and Meca-Medina,12 and by 
scrutinizing its application in OTOC and CNG.13 Section 5 investigates whether the new legislative 
approach accords with the useful effect doctrine, and if not, whether this doctrine needs to be amended 
to allow for innovative governance structures aiming to achieve SCP.14 Section 6 wraps up the 
conclusions of the previous sections.  
                                                     
5  Dutch competition law and practice is fully aligned to EU competition law and practice. In order to increase 
readability, this article therefore refers to Article 101 TFEU only, even when referring to exclusively Dutch 
settings. 
6  For more details on the Dutch story, see Monti and Mulder, op. cit. supra note 2.  
7  Minister of Economic Affairs, Policy rule on competition and sustainability 2014 and 2016 (Beleidsregel 
mededinging en duurzaamheid, Stcrt. 2014, 13375; 2016, 52945).  
8  Authority for Consumers & Markets (ACM), Vision document competition and sustainability (Visiedocument 
mededinging en duurzaamheid), May 2014, https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/13077/Vision-
document-on-Competition-and-Sustainability (last visited 13 Dec. 2018. 
9  Case C-309/99 Wouters and Others, EU:C:2002:98. 
10  In a Dutch context: F. Amtenbrink and J. van de Gronden, “Economisch recht en het Verdrag van Lissabon I: 
mededinging en interne markt”, (2008) SEW, 323-329; T. Ottervanger, “Maatschappelijk verantwoord 
concurreren. Mededingingsrecht in een veranderende wereld”, (2010) Markt & Mededinging, 93-99; E. 
Pijnacker Hordijk, “Beoordeling van duurzaamheidsinitiatieven onder het kartelverbod”, (2013) Markt & 
Mededinging, 187-195; A. Gerbrandy, “Duurzaamheidsbelangen in het mededingingsrecht”, (2013) NTER, 
326-332; A. Gerbrandy, “Toekomstbestendig mededingingsrecht”, (2016) Markt & Mededinging, 102-112.  
11  Minister of Economic Affairs, Letter to Parliament, Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 30196, 480, 1-6, 
https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/ruimte_voor_duurzaamheidsinitiatieven/details (last visited 13 Dec. 2018). 
12  Case C-309/99 Wouters; Case C-519/04 P Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission, EU:C:2006:492. 
13  Case C-1/12 Ordos dos Técnicos Oficias de Contas (OTOC), EU:C:2013:127; and case C-136/12, Consiglio 
nazionale dei geologi (CNG), EU:C:2013:489. 
14  Monti and Mulder, op. cit. supra note 2. 
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2. The constitutional fundamentals of EU competition law and policy 
The Dutch sustainability dossier begins with the Policy rule on competition and sustainability (Policy 
rule) issued by the Minister of Economic Affairs.15 Considering that sector-wide sustainability 
coordination raises costs and thus yields anticompetitive effects under Article 101(1) TFEU, the Policy 
rule instructs the Dutch competition agency (Authority for Consumers and Markets; ACM) to use a 
broad welfare standard in order to balance competition and sustainability considerations under Article 
101(3) TFEU. Broad welfare is defined in Brundtland terms – sustainable development which meets the 
needs of current generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs.16 The Commission has opposed the Policy rule because it contravenes EU competition policy 
that is based on a consumer welfare standard in terms of consumer surplus.17,18 Proponents of flexible 
antitrust however claim that this focus on economic efficiency constitutes a political choice since Article 
3(3) TEU explicitly refers to various socio-economic goals, whilst Article 11 TFEU requires the 
Commission to balance competition and sustainability when enforcing the competition rules. Also, a 
binary institutional balance would be outdated given that society is no longer organized along the 
traditional lines of the public and private domain. Rather than forcing market actors in the straitjacket 
of consumer surplus and economic efficiency, the better alternative would be a broad welfare standard 
that leaves market actors sufficient room for “direct consideration of socio-political criteria, such as 
environmental policy”.19  
The important question thus is whether the constitutional fundamentals of EU competition law allow for 
a broad welfare standard and a balancing of competition and sustainability. Constitutional treatises do 
not generally dissect the institutional balance between the market order as in market competition, the 
Union as in state and state action, and the Commission as in competition enforcement agency.20,21Aiming 
to contribute to the existing literature, this article considers the relevant constitutional context to not 
only include Article 3(3) TEU and 11 TFEU, the provisions commonly referred to by flexible antitrust 
proponents, but also Article 2 TEU and Protocol no 27 on the internal market and competition.22 These 
provisions can be separated in two constitutional strands. The first strand contains Article 3(3) TEU that 
                                                     
15  Policy rule, see note 7. 
16  World Commission on Environment and Development, Our common future (OUP, 1987).  
17  D.G. Laitenberger, Letter of 26 February 2016 to SG Camps, Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Kamerstukken II 2015/16, 30196, 463. 
18  This article does not focus on the secondary objective of EU competition law – market integration. In practice, 
this objective is to a large extent compatible with the consumer welfare objective, whilst the exceptions (hard 
core qualification of some vertical restraints) are not relevant in the context of this paper. 
19  Townley (2009), op cit. supra note 2, at 1 and 62-63. Cf. Amtenbrink and Van den Gronden, op. cit. supra note 
10; Ottervanger, op. cit. supra note 10; Townley (2011), op. cit. supra note 2; Gerbrandy (2013, 2016 and 
2017), op. cit. supra note 2 and 10; Van Rompuy, op. cit. supra note 2, at 66 and 226; Nowag, op. cit. supra 
note 2, at 28-29; Kingston, op. cit. supra note 2; Monti and Mulder, op. cit. supra note 2. 
20 Constitutional treatises generally focus on the balance between the formal EU institutions. See J-C. Piris, The 
Lisbon Treaty. A Legal and Political Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 2010); H. von der Groeben, J. 
Schwarze, A. Hatje, Europäisches Unionsrecht (Nomos, 2015); P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases 
and Materials, 6th ed. (OUP, 2015). 
21 This article refers to the “state” and “state action” rather than the Union and Union action because those notions 
better articulate the kind of entity and action referred to in the context of this paper. Also, because Article 119 
and 120 TFEU on economic policy and Article 151 and 153 TFEU on social policy specify that those objectives 
also apply to Member States’ policies. 
22 Cf. J. Drexl, “La Constitution Économique Européenne – L’Actualité du Modèle Ordolibéral”, (2011) Revue 
Internationale de Droit Économique, 419-454. Presenting an ordoliberal motivation of the European economic 
constitution, Drexl includes Protocol No 27 in the constitutional context of the competition rules and welcomes 
Art. 2 TEU as a valuable contribution because it permits an ordoliberal point of view on individual, political 
and democratic freedom, at 439-440. 
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not only specifies the objectives the EU aims to achieve, but also classifies the above institutions in this 
context. Based on Article 51 TEU, this strand includes Protocol no 27. The second strand contains 
Article 2 TEU that lists the Union’s values amongst which democracy and the rule of law. Though 
Article 11 TFEU is part of the provisions having general application in Title II TFEU and thus completes 
the objectives of Article 3(3) TEU,23 it is included in the second strand. The reason is that the values 
democracy and the rule of law are most relevant to determine the exact competences the competition 
rules confer on the Commission. The next paragraphs analyze what precisely both strands ordain and 
how they fit together. 
2.1. The first constitutional strand: Article 3(3) TEU and Protocol no 27  
Article 3(3) TEU begins with the following text: 
The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe 
based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, 
aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the 
quality of the environment.24 
Close reading shows that these two sentences form related but separate parts each of which lists different 
kinds of objectives the Union has to fulfil. The first sentence covers the establishment of an internal 
market, which, based on Protocol no 27, comes with a “system ensuring that competition is not 
distorted”. The second sentence specifies the overall aim listed in Article 3(1) TEU in several socio-
economic goals. Meanwhile, Article 3(3) TEU also specifies the institutions used to secure those goals 
– the market, the state and the competition agency. Thus, two aspects can be noted. The market order is 
listed first without having been assigned a particular (welfare) goal, whilst state action is to secure the 
socio-economic goals mentioned. Competition enforcement is separated from other state action and 
annexed to the market order. A welfare economic perspective helps to understand this institutional 
format. 
2.1.1. The institutional balance between market and state action 
It is unclear whether the High Contracting Parties knowingly put the establishment of the internal market 
first. Whilst the internal market had originally been included in Article I-3(2) of the failed Constitutional 
Treaty (now as amended Art. 3(2) TEU), the mandate of the Intergovernmental Conference that was to 
redraft the existing treaties specifically required a clearer distinction between the provisions on the 
internal market and those on the area of freedom, security and justice.25 As a consequence, the 
establishment of the internal market was moved to the beginning of Article 3(3) TEU, which makes 
sense as both market and state action are instruments to increase welfare. In that case, it also makes 
sense to put the market order first. On the one hand, living in a world of scarce resources means that the 
increase of welfare builds on their efficient use. On the other, the market order allocates resources more 
efficiently than any other method. Hayek has insightfully explained why.26 Market competition 
constitutes “decentralized planning by many separate persons” which makes “fuller use” of existing, yet 
“unorganized knowledge” regarding “each kind of scarce resource”.27 Key to the effectiveness of 
                                                     
23 Von der Groeben and others, op. cit. supra note 20, at 71. 
24  Only that part of the text of Article 3(3) TEU is quoted that is relevant for the purposes of this paper. 
25 Piris, op. cit. supra note 20, at 36. 
26 F.A. von Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, (1945) American Economic Review, 519-530. Cf. V. 
Vanberg, “Consumer welfare, total welfare and economic freedom – on the normative foundations of 
competition policy|”, in Drexl and others (Eds), Competition Policy and the Economic Approach. Foundations 
and Limitations (Edward Elgar, 2011), 44-71. 
27 Hayek, op. cit. supra note 26, at 521. 
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decentralized decision-making is the price mechanism, which enables producers and consumers “to 
communicate information” that reflects “[the] significance [of each resource] in view of the whole 
means-end structure”.28 Thus, “without anyone having to tell them what to do”, the price mechanism 
induces producers and consumers to “move in the right direction” and use scarce resources most 
sparingly.29  
The above however also indicates that the success of the market order as a most efficient allocation 
system crucially depends on the price mechanism to reflect all relevant information correctly. If not, 
competition fails to yield most efficient outcomes. This is a first reason for the state to step in and correct 
the market failure at issue. In case of SCP, the most relevant market failures are (negative) externalities 
and market power.30 “Externalities” occur when prices do not reflect all costs of a transaction. Simple 
externalities concern few stakeholders who can internalize the externality at issue by concluding 
additional transactions. But in case of complex externalities, correction by the market fails due to high 
transaction costs and extensive free riding. The result is under-correction of the externality at issue. 
“Market power” is a situation in which market actors affect the price mechanism by hampering 
competition to the extent that they become price makers rather than price takers.31 A second reason for 
the state to intervene is that people are not equally equipped in life. Based thereupon, governments may 
also want to redistribute wealth by reassigning initial endowments in order to increase fairness and social 
cohesion. Yet once market failures have been addressed and initial endowments have been reset in a 
socially acceptable way, it is (again) up to the market to maximize welfare by allocating resources most 
efficiently.32  
2.1.2. The institutional balance between competition enforcement and state regulation 
The next issue is why competition surveillance is singled out in Protocol no 27. The formal occasion for 
this protocol was the French government’s wish to no longer include the wording “where competition 
is free and undistorted” in the reference to the establishment of an internal market.33 The idea was to 
recalibrate the goals of the EU by underscoring that undistorted competition is only a means to increase 
welfare.34 The French government had overlooked, however, that Article 3(g) EC already listed the 
competition rules as a means to increase welfare.35 Some nonetheless feared that the proposed change 
would diminish the EU’s commitment to free competition, more specifically the EU’s competence to 
legislate on competition matters based on Article 308 TEC (now 352 TFEU).36 Protocol no 27 was added 
                                                     
28 Hayek, op. cit. supra note 26, at 525. 
29 Hayek, op. cit. supra note 26, at 527.  
30  The other market failures are information asymmetry and public goods.  
31  H. Rosen and T. Gayer, Public Finance (McGraw-Hill, 2012). Note that market power is not necessarily bad, 
but triggers an investigation into compensating benefits. 
32  Cf. Piris, op. cit. supra note 20, at 73. Piris identifies a twofold role of the state by reference to the social market 
economy model developed in post-war Germany in which the state, on the one hand, enables the free play of 
forces on the market by creating the framework for competition to work and, on the other, provides for a 
complete system of social protection.  
33  Piris, op. cit. supra note 20, at 74; Von der Groeben and others, op. cit. supra note 20, at 72. 
34  N. Sarkozy, Conférence de presse finale de monsieur Nicolas Sarkozy Président de la République à l’issue du 
Conseil européen, Bruxelles 23 Juin 2007, Présidence de la République, Services des Archives et de 
l’Information documentaire. “Sur le fond […] nous avons obtenu une réorientation majeure des objectifs de 
l’Union. La concurrence n’est plus un objectif de l’Union ou une fin en soi, mais un moyen au service du 
marché intérieur”. 
35  Piris, op. cit. supra note 20, at 308. 
36  Piris, op. cit. supra note 20, at 308; Von der Groeben and others, op. cit. supra note 20, at 72. 
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to confirm the latter competence.37 In addition, it also confirms that the internal market comes with a 
competition surveillance regime.38  
Yet this little constitutional history fails to explain why it makes sense to separate the correction of 
market power from the correction of the other market failures. The following reasoning provides a 
cogent explanation. To begin with, market power fundamentally differs from the other market failures.39 
Externalities, asymmetric information and public goods are the result of sector-specific characteristics 
and thus require sector-specific solutions. Market power, by contrast, is caused by market actors and 
potentially undermines the workings of the mechanism that makes each and every market successful – 
competition. Sector-specific problems are therefore to be corrected by sector-specific regulations that 
define the market concerned, whilst market power can be addressed by generally applicable rules 
protecting the competition game. It follows that competition surveillance and state action have different 
roles in making sure that the market mechanism yields most efficient outcomes. Whereas competition 
enforcement serves to secure that markets operate efficiently given the regulatory framework, state 
regulation serves to define this framework well so that the market mechanism is able to yield most 
efficient outcomes. Efficiency and consumer surplus subsequently connect the surveillance regime 
objectively to the rationale and communication-tool of the market order – most efficient use and the 
price mechanism.40 It follows logically that, in order for competition enforcement to be effective, it must 
be strict.41  
The above welfare economic perspective on the first constitutional strand shows a binary institutional 
balance with, on the one hand, the market order and strict competition enforcement, and, on the other, 
state action. Market actors may pursue any welfare goal based on the expectation that competition and 
the price mechanism will induce them to maximize welfare by allocating resources most efficiently. 
Based on efficiency and consumer surplus, strict competition enforcement makes sure they do. State 
regulation is meant to secure that markets are well-equipped to produce efficient outcomes indeed. One 
option is to price the externality explicitly and thus incentivize producers and consumers to change their 
behavior towards SCP.42 Another option is to increase the minimum standard of a sustainability 
consideration in a state measure that market actors have to abide by.43 
                                                     
37  Piris, op. cit. supra note 20, at 308; Von der Groeben and others, op. cit. supra note 20, at 72. 
38  Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, para 20. 
39  Cf. Rosen and Gayer, op. cit. supra note 31, at 47, who distinguish between market power and non-existent 
markets. 
40  On the choice of consumer surplus over total surplus: R. Pittman, “Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate 
Standard for Antitrust Enforcement”, (2007) Competition Policy International, 205; S. Salop, “Question: What 
is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard?”, (2010) Consumer Law Review, 337; E. Loozen, “The 
Requisite Legal Standard for Economic Assessments in EU Competition Cases Unravelled through the 
Economic Approach”, (2014) EL Rev., 91-110. 
41  Cf. Lyons, op. cit. supra note 4; J. Kwoka, Reviewing Merger Control. A Comprehensive Plan for Reforming 
Policy and Practice, Northeastern University 9 October 2018. 
42  An example is the EU cap-and-trade system that aims to reduce carbon emissions by putting a price on them. 
Failing a strong enough price signal to incentivize change, the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) has been 
largely ineffective. Due to a surplus of emission allowances, the price for polluting eroded to €5/tCO2. In order 
to increase prices and push for less emissions, the Council has therefore approved a reform based on which up 
to 25% of excess allowances will be bought during 5 years (Press release 92/18, 27 February 2018). J. Stiglitz 
and N. Stern have reported that the following prices would be appropriate: US$40-80/tCO2 by 2020, and 
US$50-100/tCO2 by 2030. In: Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, 29 May 2017.  
43  Cf. Odudu (2010), op. cit. supra note 4, at 609: “whether efficiency should be set aside in order to […] promote 
sustainable environment is a question for the legislature.” 
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2.2. The second constitutional strand: Article 2 TEU and 11 TFEU 
Starting point for the investigation of the second constitutional strand is Article 11 TFEU which 
stipulates that “[e]nvironmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition of the 
Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development”. 
Formally, Article 11 TFEU applies to competition policy at large as Title II of the TFEU does not 
exclude the competition rules addressing undertakings and the EU judicature confirmed its applicability 
in case of Article 101(3) TFEU.44 Yet formal applicability is insufficient to justify flexible antitrust as 
Article 7 TFEU points out that the Union’s obligation to “ensure consistency between its policies and 
activities, taking all of its objectives into account” must be interpreted “in accordance with the principle 
of conferral of powers”. The latter restriction implies that the integration obligation of Article 11 TFEU 
cannot extend the powers the competition rules confer on the Commission. As those rules contain open-
textured norms, it is necessary to specify further the meaning of the principle of conferral. This is where 
Article 2 TEU comes in.  
The principle of conferral is laid down in Article 5(1) and (2) and 13 TEU which stipulate that the Union 
and its institutions shall act within the limits of the competences conferred in the Treaties. As such, it 
focuses on the relation between the Union and the Member States rather than on the relation between 
the Union and its citizens. Ultimately, however, the principle of conferral builds on the values “rule of 
law” and “democracy” listed in Article 2 TEU – where reference to the rule of law confirms the Union 
as a legal order, and reference to democracy (primarily) confirms the Union as a representative 
democracy.45 In other words, this principle also expresses that institutions cannot act without legal basis 
and that regulations lack legitimacy when they lack parliamentary authorization.46 Based on the broader 
perspective of Article 2 TEU, the principle of conferral translates effectively in the principle of 
democratic legitimacy. The latter principle holds that, in a representative democracy, the legislator, in 
representing the citizens with whom ultimate decision-making authority resides, is the only institution 
that is democratically legitimized to decide on behalf of society as a whole what interests are to be 
secured by the exercise of public power.47 The principle of democratic legitimacy helps to determine 
whether the EU competition rules allow competition agencies and courts to balance competition and 
non-competition interests. As for the delineation between market and state action, it clarifies how the 
use of two institutions to increase welfare defines the relation between competition and non-competition 
interests within a competition law context. Regarding the delineation between competition enforcement 
and state regulation, it clarifies the restrictions of competition surveillance as a public policy instrument. 
2.2.1. The institutional balance between market and state action revisited  
A first point the principle of democratic legitimacy requires us to comprehend is the need to distinguish 
between “general interests” and “public interests” when using both market and state to increase welfare. 
“General interests” are interests that benefit all and can be realized by way of voluntary agreements. 
“Public interests” are interests that benefit all but require the use of public power in order to be realized.48 
This distinction is particularly relevant within a competition law context because it makes two points 
clear.49 One is that the market order promotes the general interest because it thrives on voluntary 
                                                     
44  Case T-451/08, Stim v Commission, EU:T:2013:189, para 103: “cultural diversity is to be borne in mind when 
considering the four conditions of Article 101(3).”  
45  Von der Groeben and others, op. cit. supra note 20, at 66-67.  
46  Von der Groeben and others, op. cit. supra note 20, at 54 and 105. 
47  The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, Safeguarding the public interest, Report No. 56 
(SDU, 2002).  Cf. Vanberg, op. cit. supra note 26. 
48  The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, op. cit. supra note 47; C. Teulings, L. Bovenberg 
and H. van Dalen, De Calculus van het publieke belang (Kenniscentrum voor Ordeningsvraagstukken, 2003).  
49  Loozen (2010), op. cit. supra note 4.  
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interaction and is not democratically legitimized to use coercion. Another is that a public interest is 
inherently embodied in a sovereign state measure as the purpose, scope and manner of safeguarding the 
interest at issue must have been determined in the legislative process in order for the use of public power 
to be democratically legitimate.50  
The distinction between the market maximizing the general interest and the legislator safeguarding the 
public interest is important because it determines the relation between competition and sustainability as 
follows. It confirms that the protection of competition has been defined as a public interest by the 
competition rules. It also clarifies that the issue of the prevailing interest depends on whether or not the 
legislator has defined a sustainability consideration as a public interest. If so, the promotion of the 
sustainability interest prevails, which is ascertained by the fact that the competition rules do not apply 
to sovereign state measures. If not, the protection of the competition interest prevails in the sense that 
an anticompetitive agreement that aims to promote sustainability must meet the conditions of Article 
101(3) TFEU in order to be legitimate.  
The result is that, whilst the competition rules do not prioritize the public competition interest over the 
public sustainability interest, they do prioritize the public competition interest over the general 
sustainability interest.  
2.2.2. The institutional balance between competition enforcement and state regulation revisited  
A second point to address is whether the Commission’s responsibility for “defining […] competition 
policy (emphasis added)”51 nonetheless allows it to balance different political interests like competition 
and sustainability in case of conflict. Given that competition enforcement is meant to be a-political, this 
would be an uneasy conclusion to reach.52 Again, the principle of democratic legitimacy helps out. It 
confirms the need to distinguish between the law-making and law-enforcement branches of public 
policy. It also helps to specify what objective competition enforcement actually means. 
“Public policy” is a somewhat vague notion that has come to encompass all what the state does.53 In its 
relation to law, it is however important to distinguish between law-making and law-enforcement 
processes in public policy since these processes warrant democratic legitimacy in a different way.54 
Law-making processes typically require political choices to be made. In the context of SCP, for example, 
the political debate will focus on whether a sustainability consideration is best secured via market 
competition or via state regulation. It is here that the general or public interest status of a sustainability 
interest is determined. In the case of law-making, democratic legitimacy is secured by, on the one hand, 
parliamentary deliberation in the legislative process, and on the other, limited judicial review since the 
making of political choices requires broad discretion.55 The Commission’s competences regarding the 
                                                     
50  The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, op. cit. supra note 47. 
51  Case C-344/98, Masterfoods and HB, ECLI:EU:C:2000:689, para 46. 
52  H. Schweitzer, “Competition Law and Public Policy: Reconsidering an Uneasy Relationship – The Example of 
Article 81” in Economic Theory and Competition Law. ASCOLA Competition Law Series (Edward Elgar, 
2009). Cf. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower 
the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper 
functioning of the internal market, 22 March 2017, COM(2017)142 final, Art. 4(2) sub a and b. Here the 
Commission proposes to ban national government instructions that might politicize EU competition 
enforcement by national competition agencies. 
53  Th. Lowi, “Law vs. Public Policy: A Critical Exploration”, (2003) Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, 
493-501; P. John, Analysing Public Policy (Pinter, 2012); J. Anderson, Public policy-making (Praeger, 1975). 
54  Lowi, op. cit. supra note 53. 
55  Case C-341/95, Bettati v Safety Hi-Tech, ECLI:EU:C:1998:353, para 35, 31-53; case C-434/02, Arnold André, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:800, para 46; case C-491/01, British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial 
Strict competition enforcement is the way forward… 
European University Institute 9 
definition of competition policy contrast sharply with the law-making branch of public policy. Its main 
competence is defined as the duty to “ensure the application of the principles laid down in Articles 101 
and 102” (Article 105(1) TFEU; emphasis added), whilst its participation in the legislative process is of 
a preparatory or executive nature (Article 103(1) and 105(3) TFEU).56 In other words, the power of the 
Commission to define competition policy concerns the enforcement of laws and political choices already 
made. In this case, democratic legitimacy is secured by the fact that the Commission is squeezed in 
between, on the one hand, the obligation to objectively execute the task and duties conferred on it by 
law, and on the other, full judicial review.57,58 This implies that the Commission, when interpreting open-
textured competition norms, is not to recalibrate the balance between competition and sustainability 
determined in the political decision-making process, but to develop a truly objective law enforcement 
policy that coherently meets both constitutional fundamentals and administrative governance principles.  
Next, the principle of democratic legitimacy helps to pinpoint three defining characteristics of objective 
competition enforcement. Legitimacy implies that competition enforcement must be confined to 
consumer surplus as this is the one economic standard that accommodates both negative and positive 
welfare effects in an objective manner.59 Legitimacy also implies that the colloquial understanding of 
the cartel prohibition as a balancing mechanism must be limited to the so-called balancing of costs 
established under Article 101(1) TFEU against compensatory benefits established under Article 101(3) 
TFEU. For, if competition enforcement is to stay away from political decision-making, either paragraph 
is precluded from conferring a balancing competence in its own right. Instead, both costs and benefits 
are to be evidenced according to the mode of analysis provided by the relevant paragraph.60 To conclude, 
legitimacy implies strict enforcement. For when the evidentiary requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU 
serve to distinguish objectively between justified and unjustified expectation of compensation, it follows 
logically that agreements that do not meet each of those requirements cannot be expected to yield 
benefits that compensate for the welfare costs established under Article 101(1) TFEU (more on this in 
Section 3).  
It follows that, when specified in terms of democratic legitimacy, the principle of conferral renders 
obsolete the formal applicability of Article 11 TFEU to the competition rules addressing undertakings.61 
The EU competition rules constitute single purpose law that prioritizes the public competition interest 
                                                     
Tobacco, ECLI:EU:C:2002:741, para 123; A.G. Geelhoed in Case C-161/04, Austria v Parliament and 
Council, EU:C:2006:66, para 39-40, 50. 
56  Even when the Council and the European Parliament legislate, they are expected to give effect to principles laid 
down in Article 101 and 102 TFEU (Article 103 TFEU) or, when those rules proof insufficient to warrant one 
of the objectives of the Treaty (in this case the establishment of an internal market that serves to yield most 
efficient use of scarce resources, EL), stay within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties (Article 
352 TFEU). Cf. Von der Groeben and others, op. cit. supra note 20, at 871; Craig and De Búrca, op. cit. supra 
note 20, at 92.  
57  Case C-67/13 P, Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB) v Commission, EU:C:2014:2204, para 44-46. The 
applicability of the manifest error standard is not motivated by limited accountability but by the nature of 
economic assessments. See: Loozen, op. cit. supra note 40. 
58  Note that the qualification of competition policy as law-enforcement policy does not make it less important from 
a public order point of view. Cf. case C-126/97, Eco Swiss in which the ECJ stated that Article [101 TFEU] 
constitutes “a fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the 
[Union] and, in particular, for the functioning of the internal market” (ECLI:EU:C:1999:269, para 36). Cf. case 
C-453/99, Courage and Crehan, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465, para 20. 
59  Obviously, welfare also stems from components of products and services that are not priced on a market, but 
unless these components can be monetized, competition agencies cannot take them into account as this would 
require a political judgement. 
60  Likewise in a US context, H. Hovenkamp, “The Rule of Reason”, (2018) Florida Law Review, 81.  
61  Cf. A.G. Kokott who has underlined that Art. 11 TFEU only applies when the Union legislates (case C-197/08, 
Commission v France, EU:C:2009:646, para 36; Odudu (2010), op. cit. supra note 4. 
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over the general sustainability interest,62 whilst the task to define competition policy does not include a 
power to balance competition and sustainability. Instead, objective enforcement means strict 
enforcement on the basis of evidence of inefficient use established according to the relevant legal 
framework.  
2.3. Conclusion on the first flexible enforcement policy 
The first flexibility policy misreads the constitutional fundamentals of the EU competition rules. These 
rules are not meant to be used as a “third way” that allows market actors to define the public interest. 
By contrast, they serve to neutrally delineate the competences of market and state for increasing welfare. 
Whereas market actors are to address inefficient situations until correction results in coercion, state 
regulation is to address inefficient situations that require coercion to be corrected. Article 3(3) TEU and 
Protocol no 27 allow market actors to pursue any welfare goal they choose, provided they do not hamper 
the efficient workings of market competition given the regulatory framework. Efficiency and consumer 
surplus do not represent a political choice, but connect the competition rules objectively to the rationale 
and the workings of the market order – most efficient use and the price mechanism. In order to be 
effective, competition enforcement should be strict as market competition is the very mechanism that 
pushes market actors towards SCP. Article 2 TEU and 11 TFEU concur with these findings. EU 
competition law prioritizes the public competition interest over the general sustainability interest. The 
Commission has not been empowered to balance competition and sustainability – neither under Article 
101(1) nor under (3) TFEU. In order to be legitimate, competition enforcement should be strict as it is 
the legal framework that determines how to objectively evidence inefficient use. The Commission thus 
rightly informed the Dutch government that competition enforcement “cannot substitute for the absence 
of […] regulation”.63 
3. The constitutional limitations of the more economic approach 
Though published jointly, the Vision document on competition and sustainability issued by ACM 
adjusts the Policy rule crucially by replacing the broad welfare standard by the consumer surplus 
standard.64 Steppingstone for this second flexibility policy is the more economic approach that would 
allow sector-wide private coordination to be excepted under Article 101(3) TFEU, provided that 
quantitative cost-benefit analysis evidences net welfare gain. This policy builds on two presumptions. 
qNWG would preclude political decision-making since negative and positive welfare effects of sector-
wide sustainability coordination are objectively accommodated within the consumer surplus standard.65 
Second, accommodation of first mover disadvantage and partial foreclosure would accord with the 
indispensability and residual competition condition of Article 101(3) TFEU.66 (“First mover 
disadvantage” has been defined in the opening paragraph of this article. “Partial foreclosure” implies 
that the restriction of competition on sustainability can be compensated by competition on other 
parameters. The indispensability and residual competition conditions are hereafter referred to as the 
“competition conditions”.)  
                                                     
62  Competition policy thus abides the Tinbergen Rule, which holds that, in order to be effective, a public policy 
instrument should only aim to secure one goal. In: J. Tinbergen, On the Theory of Economic Policy (North 
Holland, 1952). 
63  D.G. Laitenberger, op. cit. supra note 17. 
64  Vision document, op. cit. supra note 8. 
65  H. Don (Board-member ACM), “Toepassing van het ACM-visiedocument Mededinging en Duurzaamheid”, 
Presentation Vereniging van Mededingingsrecht, 11 June 2015; D.G. Laitenberger, op. cit. supra note 17. 
66  Vision document, op. cit. supra note 8, para 2.6 and 3.4.5.  
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qNWG enforcement policy traces back to the Commission decision in CECED that concerned a sector-
wide agreement banning least energy-efficient washing machines.67 Though increasing prices, the 
agreement was exempted because it would also bring compensatory benefits. In order to enable 
producers to improve upon under-correction of negative externalities by preventing free riding in an 
under-regulated economy, first mover disadvantage and partial foreclosure were accommodated under 
the competition conditions.68 Having confirmed the CECED-approach in the 2011 Guidelines on 
horizontal cooperation agreements,69 the Commission reconfirmed this approach through its support of 
ACM’s qNWG enforcement policy.70 
Current practice thus holds that evidence of qNWG may serve as a baseline for legal interpretation of 
Article 101(3) TFEU. Apparently, the principle that non-competition interests may only be taken into 
account “to the extent that they can be subsumed under the four conditions of Article [101(3)]” is to be 
interpreted less strict after all.71 To judge whether this makes for sound competition enforcement, two 
issues will be analyzed. Whether constitutional enforcement fundamentals allow the more economic 
approach to be translated in a qNWG enforcement policy. Second, whether first mover disadvantage 
and partial foreclosure meet the competition conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU.  
3.1. qNWG enforcement policy and the constitutional limitations of the more economic approach 
How does qNWG work as an enforcement policy? qNWG monetizes the positive welfare effects 
expected to result from the correction of non-priced negative externalities and calculates whether they 
offset the pertaining expected negative welfare effects in terms of price increase resulting from sector-
wide coordination. Dependent on net outcome, an agreement may or may not be excepted from the cartel 
prohibition. So far, ACM based two (informal) decisions on this approach – Coal-Fired Power Plants 
and Chicken of Tomorrow.72 The first case concerned the closure of five old coal-fired power plants 
agreed between Dutch energy producers. Here, the emission reductions of SO2, NO2 and particulate 
matters were monetized on the basis of shadow prices and avoided damage costs.73 The second case 
concerned the introduction of a higher environmental and animal welfare standard for chicken breast 
agreed between supermarkets, broiler farmers and meat processors. Here, the environmental and animal 
welfare benefits were monetized on the basis of a willingness-to-pay analysis. ACM stopped both 
agreements because they were estimated to result in net welfare loss.  
The above shows that qNWG enforcement policy builds on (estimated) quantitative outcome. Thus, it 
presumes that welfare maximization (this time in terms of consumer surplus) has become the direct goal 
of the competition rules as a result of the more economic approach. This presumption is incorrect. 
                                                     
67  Case IV.F.1/36.718 CECED, O.J. 2000, L 187/47. 
68  Case IV.F.1/36.718 CECED, para 58-66. 
69  Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal cooperation agreements, O.J. 
2011, C 11/1, para 329.  
70  D.G. Laitenberger, op. cit. supra note 17. 
71  Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, O.J. 2004, C 101/97, para 42. 
72  ACM, Analysis by ACM of the “Planned Agreement on Closing Down Coal-Fired Power Plants From the 
1980s as Part of the SER Energy Accord,” 26 September 2013, 
http://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/12033/Notitie-ACM-over-sluiting-5-kolencentrales-in-SER-
Energieakkoord (last visited 13 Dec. 2018); and, ACM, Assessment of the sustainability agreements 
“Chicken of Tomorrow”, ACM/DM/2014/206028, January 2015, 
https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/13789/ACMs-analysis-of-the-sustainability-arrangements-
concerning-the-Chicken-of-Tomorrow (last visited 13 Dec. 2018). 
73  For a more detailed account of the workings of qNWG in this case: E. Kloosterhuis and M. Mulder, 
“Competition Law and Environmental Protection: The Dutch Agreement on Coal-Fired Power Plants”, (2015) 
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 1-26. 
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Simply because it overlooks that competition enforcement still has to abide by the constitutional 
fundamentals of EU competition law. As explained earlier, those fundamentals provide for the 
competition regime to protect the mechanism that spurs market actors to maximize welfare – 
competition. Accordingly, the ECJ time and again underscores the importance of protecting competition 
in itself. For example, when observing that those rules cover “not only [market behavior] that directly 
cause[s] harm to consumers but also [market behavior] that cause[s] harm through their impact on 
competition”.74 This, however, implies that, even though competition is only a means to increase 
welfare, the protection thereof is a goal in itself within the context of competition enforcement. This 
also implies that welfare maximization is not a direct but an indirect goal of the competition rules.  
This misunderstanding regarding the interplay between protecting competition and promoting welfare 
has led to two further misunderstandings. qNWG enforcement policy overlooks that the competition 
rules serve to protect “competition on the merits” and “consumer sovereignty” in order for the market 
order to work as an “invisible hand”. As explained by Vanberg, the first concept reflects “the ideal of a 
market order framed by rules that aim at making producers responsive to consumer interest”, while the 
second concept underlines that “consumer preferences are the ultimate controlling force in the process 
of competition”.75 Thus, for competition enforcement to protect effectively the efficient workings of the 
market mechanism, competition agencies should acknowledge two essential conditions. First, that 
competition on the merits builds on first mover advantage and new entry to secure producer 
responsiveness to consumer interest. More specifically, first mover advantage rewards producers that 
push for better quality and innovation, after which new entry allows prices to fall in the longer term. 
Second, that consumer sovereignty builds on consumer choice. Together, both concepts necessitate a 
competition policy that allows individual consumers to guard their individual consumer surplus and self-
assess whether the value added is worth the price increase rather than competition agencies deciding on 
their behalf.  
qNWG enforcement policy also overlooks that the more economic approach cannot possibly recalibrate 
the mode of cost-benefit analysis provided by the relevant legal framework. Given the constitutional 
mandate discussed earlier, it appears that this approach rather serves for the Commission and its national 
counterparts to translate open-textured competition norms in a coherent set of evidentiary 
requirements.76 If the translation is done properly, the more economic approach then develops into a 
functional approach that systematically connects the separate evidentiary requirements of the legal 
framework to the rationale and workings of the market mechanism.77 Also important in this functional 
interpretation of the more economic approach is that each individual requirement serves to gather 
complementary information as to what extent specific market behavior affects the efficient workings of 
market competition, while together they gather all information necessary. This functional approach 
moves competition enforcement forward in two crucial ways. It warrants objective enforcement as the 
allocation of specific evidence to separate requirements prevents a balancing of costs and benefits other 
than foreseen by the legislator. It also warrants effective enforcement as together all requirements secure 
that private coordination will actually promote welfare – in this case SCP. Again, it turns out that 
legitimate enforcement implies strict enforcement – if not all evidentiary requirements are met, private 
coordination cannot be expected to promote SCP. 
                                                     
74  Case C-209/10, Post Danmark, EU:C:2012:172, para 20. Cf. cases C-6/72, Europemballage Corporation and 
Continental Can Company v Commission, EU:C:1973:22, para 26; C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands and Others, 
EU:C:2009:343, para 38; C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, EU:C:2010:603, para 176; case C-
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75  Vanberg, op. cit. supra note 26, at 56.  
76  E.g. Odudu (2006), op. cit. supra note 4; Loozen (2010), op. cit. supra note 4, Vanberg, op. cit. supra note 26; 
J. Wright and D. Ginsburg, “The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice”, (2013) Fordham Law Review, 
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77  Loozen (2010), op. cit. supra note 4. 
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3.2. First mover disadvantage and partial foreclosure under the competition conditions  
The question has thus become whether accommodation of first mover disadvantage and partial 
foreclosure concur with the indispensability and residual competition conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU 
when functionally interpreted. The indispensability condition protects consumers against overcharges 
resulting from restrictions of competition that are not necessary to achieve the consumer welfare benefits 
established under the first two conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU.78 The residual competition condition 
protects rivalry and the competitive process.79  
Accommodation of first mover disadvantage under the indispensability condition is based on the 
argument that this phenomenon may preclude producers from investing in sustainability. But, whilst it 
is true that the private coordination mechanism may hamper in case of complex external effects as a 
result of free riding, it is also true that producers may typically find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma 
and simply want to avoid competition.80 The urge to avoid competition becomes particularly urgent 
when producers have become last movers trying to catch up with the real first movers. Actually, both 
Dutch cases concern last mover situations. The agreement in Coal-Fired Power Plants was meant to 
facilitate the closure of ancient power plants. The agreement in Chicken of Tomorrow helped broiler 
farmers to catch up with competitors already offering better quality chicken breast.81 If anything, these 
cases show that claims of first mover disadvantage call for vigilance. Accommodation of first mover 
disadvantage under the indispensability condition accomplishes the opposite, however. The reason is 
that it mixes up the investigations of the first and third condition of Article 101(3) TFEU. The benefit 
condition serves to establish that an agreement is able to correct a negative externality (and thus promote 
welfare). The indispensability condition serves to establish that there is no lesser restrictive alternative 
to correct the externality. More specifically, the latter analysis investigates the necessity of an agreement 
compared to another, less restrictive agreement.82 Whilst duplicating an analysis that has already been 
done (whether sector-wide coordination is able to correct a negative externality has already been covered 
under the benefit condition), the accommodation of first mover disadvantage broadens the scope of the 
indispensability condition from relative to absolute necessity. The result is that the indispensability 
condition no longer effectively protects competition on the merits and the consumer is to pay for 
unnecessary overcharges. A case in point is CECED, where the alleged benefits could also have been 
realized through the introduction of a non-restrictive label combined with an effective ad campaign.83 
Accommodation of partial foreclosure under the residual competition condition is a consistent feature 
of current law enforcement.84 Sector-wide private coordination of a specific competition parameter is 
condoned as long as it does “not touch on other competition factors”85 and “competition will still take 
                                                     
78  Guidelines on Article 81(3), para 73 and 75. 
79  Guidelines on Article 81(3), para 105. 
80  E. van Damme, “Goede marktwerking en overige publieke belangen”, (2017) Markt & Mededinging, 5-17, at 
15. 
81  Chicken of Tomorrow, at 7. 
82  Guidelines on Article 81(3): “the restrictive agreement as such must be reasonably necessary in order to achieve 
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means of achieving the efficiencies” (para 75). 
83  Loozen (2010), op. cit. supra note 4, at 32; H. Schweitzer, “Die Bedeutung nicht-wettbewerblicher Aspekte für 
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84  Note that the General Court likewise condoned sector-wide coordination by football player’s agents under 
Article 101(3) TFEU. See case T-193/02, Piau v Commission, EU:T:2005:22. 
85  Case IV.F.1/36.718 CECED, para 65-66. 
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place for other product characteristics”.86 The reason for this permissive attitude may well be that these 
agreements do not restrict rivalry and innovation above a newly established minimum sustainability 
threshold. All the same, accommodation of partial foreclosure does not meet the requirements of 
functional interpretation. Partial foreclosure obstructs consumer sovereignty and allows competition 
enforcement to substitute for the absence of regulation. Given that the cartel prohibition serves to filter 
out private corrections of negative externalities that require coercion, it falls upon the residual 
competition condition to not only warrant dynamic efficiency as in ongoing innovation, but also 
safeguard democratically legitimized consumer choice within the market conditions set by the 
regulatory state. The latter requires a strict interpretation of the last condition of Article 101(3) TFEU 
based on which the effects on residual competition should be investigated per individual competition 
parameter.  
It follows that neither first mover disadvantage nor partial foreclosure meet the competition conditions 
of Article 101(3) TFEU when functionally interpreted. Recalibrating the evidentiary framework, they 
cause the cartel prohibition to move away from its primary objective – protect against cartelization. 
3.3. Conclusion on the second flexible enforcement policy 
The second flexibility policy misses out on the constitutional limitations of the more economic approach. 
qNWG enforcement policy overlooks that the goal of the competition rules is not to promote welfare 
directly, but to effectively protect competition in order for the market mechanism to promote welfare by 
yielding most efficient outcomes given the regulatory context. It also overlooks that the more economic 
approach cannot recalibrate the mode of cost-benefit analysis provided by the relevant legal framework, 
but serves to effectively connect the art of competition law enforcement to the efficient workings of a 
market order that is based on competition on the merits and consumer sovereignty. It may do so by 
translating open-textured legal norms in a coherent set of functional evidentiary requirements. The result 
is that qNWG enforcement policy is neither legitimate nor effective. It is not legitimate because 
recalibrating the legal framework in both conceptual and evidentiary terms makes for political decision-
making per se. Albeit in a consumer surplus context, qNWG does exactly what the Commission 
criticized the Policy rule for – using competition enforcement policy to substitute for the absence of 
regulation.87 It is not effective because accommodation of first mover disadvantage and partial 
foreclosure frustrates the competition conditions to fulfil their proper role.88 Whilst first mover 
disadvantage may well not be real, consumers have to pay the cartel overcharge. If first mover 
disadvantage is real, the state is in a better position to regulate effectively. Given that the purpose of 
protecting competition is to push the market to engage in SCP, it would be most helpful if the 
Commission would revise current practice. 
4. The constitutional limitations of the legitimate objective doctrine  
Disappointed by the results of qNWG enforcement policy under Article 101(3) TFEU, scholars have 
suggested to extend flexible enforcement to Article 101(1) TFEU.89 Steppingstone for this third policy 
is the legitimate objective doctrine introduced in Wouters in which sector-wide private coordination by 
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89  Pijnacker Hordijk, op. cit. supra note 10; Gerbrandy and Claassen, op. cit. supra note 2; Monti and Mulder, op. 
cit. supra note 2. 
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the Bar of the Netherlands (Bar) did not qualify as a “restriction of competition” because the 
anticompetitive effects were “necessary and proportionate” to ensure the implementation of a 
“legitimate objective”.90 Inspired by internal market law, the ECJ would have allowed the Bar to balance 
competition and non-competition interests under Article 101(1) TFEU.91 Subsequent case law in Meca-
Medina, OTOC and CNG would have confirmed this reading of Wouters. 
The pressing issue is whether the above account of the legitimate objective doctrine is correct. This 
requires three analyses. Whether Wouters actually contains a balancing act allowing for a flexible 
interpretation of a “restriction of competition”. Second, whether Meca-Medina is in line with its 
predecessor and constitutional fundamentals. Third, whether OTOC and CNG confirm a flexible reading 
of the legitimate objective doctrine indeed.92  
4.1. Wouters up close  
Wouters concerned a situation of delegated regulatory power. Mandated by Dutch law, the Bar had 
issued the Regulation on Joint Professional Activity (JPA-Regulation) that prohibited members of the 
Bar to “assume or maintain any obligations” that might jeopardize the proper practice of the legal 
profession as defined in “essential rules adopted for that purpose”.93 Based upon the JPA-Regulation, 
lawyers were prohibited to form structural partnerships with accountants.94 Notwithstanding its public 
mandate, the ECJ held the Bar accountable under the competition rules because this organization 
constitutes an association of undertakings and the JPA-Regulation is attributable to the Bar alone.95 Yet, 
even though the JPA-Regulation triggered anticompetitive effects, it was held not to infringe upon 
Article 101(1) TFEU because it was “necessary for the proper practice of the legal profession, as 
organized in the Member State concerned”.96 The next paragraphs set out to clarify that the ECJ did not 
bestow any balancing power upon the Bar (nor upon competition agencies or the judiciary for that 
matter). 
Most important is that the ECJ applied a two-stage method of analysis.97 A first stage covers the part of 
the regulatory exercise attributed to the state – the essential rules governing the legal profession and 
those governing accountants.98 A second stage covers the part of the regulatory exercise attributed to the 
Bar – the (enforcement of the) JPA-Regulation.99 At the first stage, the ECJ held that a Member State is 
                                                     
90  Case C-309/99, Wouters, para 97-110. 
91  Amtenbrink and Van den Gronden, op. cit. supra note 10; Pijnacker Hordijk, op. cit. supra note 10; Gerbrandy 
(2013 and 2016), op. cit. supra note 10; Monti and Mulder, op. cit. supra note 2, Van Rompuy, op. cit. supra 
note 2, at 240-244; Witt, op. cit. supra note 2, at 29. 
92  Pijnacker Hordijk, op. cit. supra note10; Julian Nowag, “Wouters, When the Condemned Live Longer: A 
Comment on OTOC and CNG”, (2015) ECLR; Monti and Mulder, op. cit. supra note 2. 
93  Case C-309/99, Wouters, para 9, 15 and 100. Those essential rules included the partisan defense of clients’ 
interests and the corresponding relationship of trust between lawyer and client. 
94  Case C-309/99, Wouters, para 17, 18, 22, 25-26 and 28-29. 
95  Case C-309/99, Wouters, para 54-71. 
96  Case C-309/99, Wouters, para 110. 
97  Loozen (2006 and 2010), op. cit. supra note 4. Also critical on a flexible interpretation of Wouters: Ch. Janssen 
and E. Kloosterhuis, “The Wouters case law, special for a different reason?”, (2017) ECLR, 335-339. 
98  Case C-309/99, Wouters, para 98-104. Note that the attribution to the state is not watertight since the essential 
rules are only part of the Advocatenwet as from 2015. The attribution is nonetheless comprehensible given that 
the essential rules reflect the legal traditions common to the Member States and the Union, as recognized in 
earlier case law (case C-155/79, AMES, EU:C:1982:157, para 24).  
99  Case C-309/99, Wouters, para 105-109. 
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in principle free to regulate the exercise of the legal profession in its territory,100 and that the essential 
rules applicable to lawyers and those applicable to accountants are substantively different.101 Since the 
reference to internal market law relates to the regulatory exercise attributed to the state, it cannot serve 
to evidence conferral of balancing power upon the Bar.  
At the second stage, the ECJ concluded that the anticompetitive effects inherent to the JPA-Regulation 
are not originally caused by the Bar. Translating the ancillarity doctrine introduced in Remia to a public 
interest setting,102 the ECJ did not submit the JPA-Regulation to a competition analysis, but to a necessity 
analysis relative to the essential rules governing the legal profession. This analysis served to establish 
whether the JPA-Regulation is indispensable to ensure that lawyers comply with the essential rules 
already in place (in which case the anticompetitive effects have not been caused by the Bar) or adds an 
additional anticompetitive layer (in which case there would be further anticompetitive effects that do 
stem from the Bar). The JPA-Regulation qualified within the first category. Given the non-match 
between the two sets of essential rules applicable to lawyers and accountants, the regulation only 
specifies the essential rules governing the legal profession.  
The above leads to the following conclusion on Wouters. As a matter of fact, the ECJ used an ancillarity 
analysis to scrutinize the legitimacy of the restrictive effects resulting from the JPA-Regulation. In doing 
so, it did not bestow any balancing power upon the Bar. Instead, it combined a straightforward 
application of the state action doctrine (based on which the JPA-Regulation was attributed to the Bar) 
with a functional interpretation of a “restriction of competition” (the JPA-Regulation did not yield 
anticompetitive effects other than those already caused by the essential rules governing the legal 
profession).  
4.2. Meca-Medina vs Wouters  
Meca-Medina did not concern a situation of delegated regulatory power. Nonetheless, the ECJ applied 
the legitimate objective doctrine to the anti-doping rules issued by the IOC and implemented by FINA. 
Two findings are key. First, that anti-doping rules may produce anticompetitive effects because they 
“may result in an athlete’s unwarranted exclusion from sporting events, […]”.103 Second, that those rules 
are not prohibited by Article 101(1) TFEU if “the restrictions […] imposed [are] limited to what is 
necessary to ensure the proper conduct of competitive sport […]”.104 But is the ECJ right to presume 
that anti-doping rules may produce anticompetitive effects, and does the method of analysis applied in 
Meca-Medina concur with the one applied in Wouters?  
To begin with, anti-doping rules are not likely to produce anticompetitive effects. By assuring athletes 
that their opponents compete fairly, anti-doping rules facilitate sports competition rather than restricting 
downstream market competition. Likewise, the General Court and Advocate General Léger had 
concluded earlier that anti-doping rules qualify as “purely sporting rules”.105 The risk of unwarranted 
exclusion does not make this any different because penalties are subject to appeal to the Court of 
                                                     
100  Case C-309/99, Wouters, para 99, 100, 105, 107 and 110. Most importantly: “The current approach of the 
Netherlands, [...]” (para 100) and “[…] having regard to the prevailing perceptions of the professions in [the 
Netherlands]” (para 105).  
101  Case C-309/99, Wouters para 100, 102-104. 
102  Case C-42/84, Remia v Commission, EU:C:1985:327; case C-382/12 P, MasterCard a.o./Commission, 
EU:C:2014:2201. Cf. R. Whish and D. Bailey, Competition Law, 7th ed. (OUP, 2015), at 138. 
103  Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina, para 47-49. 
104  Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina, para 47. 
105  Case T-313/02, Meca-Medina and Majcen, EU:T:2004:282; A.G. Léger in case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and 
Majcen, EU:C:2006:201. 
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Arbitration for Sport (CAS).106 According to the German Supreme Court, the CAS” rules of procedure 
“contain adequate guarantees for safeguarding the rights of athletes”, amongst others because “its 
arbitration awards are subject to review by the Swiss Federal Court”.107 It is telling that the athletes had 
chosen not to appeal the CAS award to the Swiss Federal Court.108 
Also, the method of analysis applied in Meca-Medina differs from the one applied in Wouters. Crucial 
to the Wouters ancillarity analysis is that it builds on the combination of delegated regulatory power and 
a publicly defined legitimate objective. The Bar has a public mandate to regulate the profession – which 
yields antitrust immunity for sector-wide private coordination as such. In addition, the JPA-Regulation 
specifies the essential rules attributed to the state – which makes it possible to submit this regulation to 
an objective necessity analysis in relation to those rules. Meca-Medina lacks a similar context. The IOC 
does not enjoy a public mandate,109 nor do the anti-doping rules specify publicly defined principles of 
“good sportsmanship”. Trying to overcome these differences, the ECJ created an artificial distinction 
between the anti-doping rules and their enforcement, whilst it had not distinguished between the JPA 
Regulation and its enforcement in Wouters.  
The result is unfortunate. On the one hand, recourse to the legitimate objective doctrine is unnecessary 
because anti-doping rules do not restrict competition. On the other, Meca-Medina widens the legitimate 
objective doctrine introduced in Wouters in order to reconcile those rules with the cartel prohibition. 
Allowing a balancing of competition and non-competition interests under Article 101(1) TFEU not only 
contrasts sharply with constitutional fundamentals, but also with consistent case law based on which the 
promotion of welfare by restrictive agreements can only be legitimized by fulfilling the conditions of 
Article 101(3) TFEU.110   
4.3. Meca-Medina in practice 
A last point to consider is how the Meca-Medina widening of the legitimate objective doctrine works 
out in later case law – OTOC and CNG. 
OTOC concerned the Order of Chartered Accountants that holds a public mandate to “promote continued 
training” and “plan, organize and provide compulsory training schemes” for chartered accountants in 
Portugal.111 Based thereupon, OTOC issued the Training Credit Regulation (TC-Regulation) aimed at 
securing the quality of services provided by its members.112 Starting point for the application of the 
legitimate objective doctrine is that the TC-Regulation artificially segments the market of compulsory 
training for chartered accountants (a third of which is reserved to OTOC), while imposing discriminatory 
conditions on the remaining segment of that market to the detriment of OTOC’s competitors.113 
Acknowledging that the TC-Regulation effectively contributes to the quality of the services offered by 
                                                     
106  Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina, para 5-6. 
107  Bundesgerichtshof, case KZR 6/15, Pechstein v International Skating Union, 
DE:BGH:2016:070616UKZR6.15.0 
108  Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina, para 14. 
109  Cf. Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 83. 
110  Case C-136/86, BNIC v Aubert, EU:C:1987:524; joined cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 
P – C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P, Limburgse Vinylmaatschappij and Others v Commission, EU:C:2002:582; 
case T-29/92, SPO and Others v Commission, EU:T:1995:34; joined cases T-49/02 – T-51/02, Brasserie 
nationale v Commission, EU:T:2005:298; joined cases T-5/00 and T-6/00, Nederlandse Federatieve 
Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission, EU:T: 2003:342; case C-209/07, 
Beef Industry Development and Barry Brothers, EU:C:2008:643. 
111  Case C-1/12, OTOC, para 4. 
112  Case C-1/12, OTOC, para 2. 
113  Case C-1/12, OTOC, para 62. 
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chartered accountants, the ECJ nonetheless holds those restrictions to go beyond what is necessary to 
warrant that objective.114 The reservation of training sessions to OTOC eliminate competition on a 
substantial part of the relevant market, while the discriminatory conditions for access to the market are 
not indispensable since the quality of those services could have been safeguarded by a less restrictive 
alternative. Unlike Wouters, this motivation does not reflect an ancillarity analysis under Article 101(1) 
TFEU, but a competition analysis under the last two conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU.115 The reason 
for “borrowing” the Article 101(3) analyses is obvious. It is impossible to conduct an ancillarity analysis 
under Article 101(1) TFEU when a publicly defined reference point to investigate the objective necessity 
of the TC-Regulation, is lacking. 
CNG concerned the National Association of Geologists that holds a public mandate to warrant the proper 
practice of the geologist profession in Italy.116 Although the public mandate used to include the power 
to determine fees, all laws and regulations imposing compulsory fixed or minimum fee scales for the 
liberal professions had been repealed in 2006.117 CNG nonetheless continued the operation of a Code of 
Conduct (Code) based on which fees set below a certain level may be penalized on grounds of breach 
of “dignity of the profession”.118 Bypassing the legitimate objective doctrine, the Italian competition 
agency had held the Code to be anticompetitive.119 Considering that all fixed and minimum tariffs had 
been repealed, the classification of the fee scale as a legitimate reference criterion for remuneration was 
held to encourage geologists to set their fees accordingly, whilst the obligation to determine fees in 
accordance with general standards like “dignity of the profession” was held to strengthen the compulsory 
perception of the fee scale. However, the ECJ reasoned differently. Although a rule penalizing fees 
below a certain level was held to restrict competition,120 it also found that dignity of the profession may 
be a legitimate factor to determine professional remuneration because this may be necessary to ensure 
the quality of geologists’ services.121 Following which the ECJ referred the case back to the national 
court as it was unable to apply the necessity test because dignity of the profession is only one of several 
relevant remuneration criteria closely linked to the quality of geologists’ work.122 This referral surprises 
and actually shows the weakness of the Meca-Medina widening of the legitimate objective doctrine. For 
how possibly could the national court be in a better position to apply the necessity test given that a 
publicly defined reference point is missing and the national legislator has repealed this type of 
restrictions?  
The above cases show that the Meca-Medina version of the legitimate objective doctrine does not work 
out in practice.123 Most importantly because it is impossible to conduct an ancillarity test if a publicly 
defined objective is lacking. In OTOC, the ECJ thus resorted to competition analyses that are conducted 
                                                     
114  Case C-1/12, OTOC, para 96 and 100. 
115  Case C-1/12, OTOC, para 97-99. The ECJ confirms this similarity in para 103. 
116  Case C-136/12, CNG, para 5 and 6. 
117  Case C-136/12, CNG, para 7.  
118  Case C-136/12, CNG, para 38. 
119  Case C-136/12, CNG, para 11 and 12. 
120  Case C-136/12, CNG, para 52. 
121  Case C-136/12, CNG, para 53. 
122  Case C-136/12, CNG, para 54 and 55. Other criteria are the scale and difficulty of the task to be performed, 
technical knowledge and the commitment required. 
123  Another, but less instructive example is Joined Cases C-427/16 and C-428/16 CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:890. This case concerns national legislation that prohibits lawyers and clients to agree on 
remuneration below a minimum amount to be set by a lawyers” professional organization. Bringing up the 
legitimate objective doctrine, the ECJ referred the case back to the national court because it could not apply 
the doctrine on the basis of the file before it.   
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generally under the competition conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU. In CNG, the ECJ simply referred 
the case back to the national court.  
4.4. Conclusion on the third flexible enforcement policy 
The third flexibility policy misunderstands the constitutional limitations of the legitimate objective 
doctrine. Close reading shows that Wouters does not actually deviate from first principles and strict 
enforcement, but combines a straightforward use of the state action doctrine with a functional 
interpretation of a “restriction of competition”. Meca-Medina on the other hand does operate a balancing 
mechanism under Article 101(1) TFEU. The added value thereof is not self-evident when compared to 
the mechanisms already provide in place. The ancillarity analysis under 101(1) TFEU requires an 
agreement to be based on a public mandate and concur with a publicly defined welfare objective in order 
for society to trust that it does not yield additional costs. The efficiency analysis under 101(3) TFEU 
checks upon a self-selected welfare objective and thus requires an agreement to fulfil the welfare and 
competition conditions in order for society to trust that the benefits of an agreement outweigh its costs. 
On the one hand, Meca-Medina does not seem to cause much harm. Anti-doping rules are not likely to 
restrict competition anyway, while OTOC and CNG seem to confirm that a widened legitimate objective 
doctrine does not work out in practice. On the other hand, Meca-Medina does obscure the purpose and 
meaning of EU competition law and motivates the broad welfare and balancing propositions for 
antitrust. It would therefore be most welcome if the ECJ would explicitly return to the legitimate 
objective doctrine in its original and constitutionally correct setting. 
5. The constitutional limitations of the useful effect doctrine 
 Following the Commission’s opposition to the Policy rule, the Dutch government has devised a fourth 
policy that will preclude competition enforcement altogether in order for the market to promote SCP. 
Enabling the government to declare private sustainability initiatives generally binding, the proposal for 
a new legislative approach aims to kill three birds with one stone.124 “Green coalitions” that enjoy “broad 
societal support” may overcome first mover disadvantage. The responsibility for prioritizing 
sustainability over competition will shift from the competition agency to the government. Meanwhile, 
sustainability will be maximized as the new legislative approach makes utmost use of the innovative 
power of civil society. Steppingstone is the useful effect doctrine that specifies the loyalty obligation of 
Member States under Article 4(3) TEU in the context of the competition rules. The new legislative 
approach would comply with this doctrine since declaratory regulations will follow on private 
initiatives, not on coordinated conduct. Alternatively, the useful effect doctrine would not apply in the 
first place since declaratory regulations will constitute sovereign state measures that set aside the 
competition rules in their own right. Less optimistic on compliance with the useful effect doctrine, 
scholars have put forward that this doctrine is in need of repair. Because the delegation prong focuses 
on procedural responsibility, it would obstruct “innovative non-State structures of governance”, while 
lagging behind the more substantive approach of the legitimate objective doctrine.125  
Again, the issue is whether the above arguments are correct. Is absence of anticompetitive private 
coordination sufficient to warrant the useful effect of the competition rules? Does parliamentary 
involvement secure the sovereignty of declaratory regulations indeed? If not, is the useful effect doctrine 
in need of repair to promote SCP? 
                                                     
124  Minister of Economic Affairs, op. cit. supra note 11, 3. 
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5.1. The two prongs of the useful effect doctrine  
The useful effect doctrine constitutes a specific branch of the EU state action doctrine that serves to 
prevent Member States from enacting state measures that enable undertakings to escape antitrust 
accountability.126 Ever since Reiff,127 case law consistently holds that this doctrine operates two separate 
prongs.128 Focusing on the presence of anticompetitive coordination, the first prong prohibits Member 
States to require or favor the adoption of agreements contrary to the cartel prohibition, or to reinforce 
their anticompetitive effects. Focusing on the exercise of regulatory authority, the second prong 
prohibits Member States to deprive legislation of its official character by delegating to private traders 
the responsibility for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere. The rationale for a separate second 
prong is obvious. As the first is easy to circumvent, it is adamant to have an additional test that filters 
out proper state action by ascertaining that the legislator has been responsible for displacing “the 
competition rules with an alternative scheme”.129,130  
It follows that the absence of anticompetitive private coordination is insufficient to warrant useful effect. 
The question thus becomes whether the new legislative approach meets the requirements for absence of 
delegation that follow from landmark cases on national regulation on the fixing of tariffs in the transport 
sector (Reiff, Delta Schiffahrt- und Speditionsgesellschaft and Centro Servizi Spediporto), and on access 
to the legal profession and the determination of a scale for determining legal fees and emoluments 
(Arduino, Mauri and Cipolla). All those cases operate a twofold requirement for a regulatory measure 
to qualify as proper state action: The state must have both originator and concluder responsibility. 
“Originator responsibility” reflects the fact that all state measures in those cases originated with the 
legislator who had defined the main elements (objectives, method and criteria) that were to be specified 
in the subsequent regulatory exercise involving market actors.131 “Concluder responsibility” reflects the 
fact that all state measures were signed off by the state who verified the input of market actors in light 
of the main elements set earlier by the legislator.132 In other words, a regulatory measure based on market 
involvement only qualifies as sovereign state action if it starts out as state legislation, while not losing 
its character of state legislation along the way.133 Thus, the useful effect doctrine corresponds with the 
US state action doctrine that limits antitrust immunity to those situations where the state has “clearly 
                                                     
126  Case C-13/77, INNO/ATAB, EU:C:1977:185.   
127  Case C-185/91, Bundesanstalt für den Güterfernverkehr v Reiff, EU:C:1993:886. Actually, Reiff confirmed that 
delegation constituted a separate prong as had been indicated already in case C-267/86, Van Eycke/ASPA, 
EU:C:1988:427. On the two prongs of the useful effect doctrine: Harm Schepel, “Delegation of Regulatory 
Powers to Private Parties under EC Competition Law Towards a Procedural Public Interest Test”, (2002) CML 
Rev., 31-51. 
128  Case C-153/93, Germany v Delta Schiffahrt- und Speditionsgesellschaft, EU:C:1994:240; case C-96/94, Centro 
Servizi Spediporto v Spedizioni Maritimma del Golfo, EU:C:1995:308; case C-35/99, Arduino, 
EU:C:2002:389; case C-250/03, Mauri, EU:C:2005:96; joined cases C-94/04 and C-202/04, Cipolla and 
Others, EU:C:2006:758. 
129  Case C-185/91, Reiff, para 15-23; case C-153/93, Delta Schiffahrt- und Speditionsgesellschaft, para 15-22; case 
C-96/94, Centro Servizi Spediporto, para 22-30; case C-35/99, Arduino, para 36-43; case C-250/03, Mauri, 
para 30-38; joined cases C-94/04 and C-202/04, Cipolla, para 47-53.  
130  Daniel Crane, “Judicial review of anticompetitive state action: two models in comparative perspective”, (2013) 
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 418-436, at 421. 
131  Case C-185/91, Reiff, para 3-5 and 21; case C-153/93, Delta Schiffahrt- und Speditionsgesellschaft, para 3-8 
and 20; case C-96/94, Centro Servizi Spediporto, para 3-8; case C-35/99, Arduino, para 3-9; case C-250/03, 
Mauri, para 4; joined cases C-94/04 and C-202/04, Cipolla, para 3-6.  
132  Case C-185/91, Reiff, para 22; case C-153/93, Delta Schiffahrt- und Speditionsgesellschaft, para 21; case C-
96/94, Centro Servizi Spediporto, para 23 and 27-28; case C-35/99, Arduino, para 41; case C-250/03, Mauri, 
para 32-36; joined cases C-94/04 and C-202/04, Cipolla, para 49-52. 
133  Cf. Monti and Mulder, op. cit. supra note 2, at 652. 
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articulated and affirmatively expressed” state policy, and subsequent market involvement is “actively 
supervised” by the state itself.134 
It appears that the new legislative approach does not meet the above requirements. Defining 
sustainability in broad Brundtland-terms only, the draft-statute fails to articulate the main elements 
private sector initiatives are to specify. Absent originator responsibility, the Ministers concerned cannot 
even start to take concluder responsibility as they lack a reference framework to verify the 
appropriateness and proportionality of the initiatives submitted.135 
5.2. Do declaratory regulations constitute sovereign state measures? 
Aiming to escape the applicability of the useful effect doctrine, the Dutch government alternatively 
argues that this doctrine does not apply in the first place. For, albeit upon the initiative of market actors 
(or other stakeholders), it will be the Ministers, having heard parliament, who will ultimately decide 
whether to follow up on a petition for a declaratory regulation.136 This would imply that the main 
elements of state policy will be determined in the political decision-making process as a result which 
declaratory regulations yield sovereign state measures that set aside the public competition interest in a 
democratically legitimate manner.137 However, in representative democracies like the EU Member 
States, democratic legitimacy and sovereignty crucially depend on state measures being determined in 
a deliberative process in which all citizens are represented. In other words, for declaratory regulations 
to constitute sovereign state measures, they must be based on full parliamentary involvement according 
to Dutch rule-making standards. So, the question is whether declaratory regulations meet this 
requirement. 
According to the draft-statute, parliamentary involvement will take place based on a so-called 
verification procedure.138 Whereas the scope of parliamentary involvement may vary from a simple 
exchange of views to no involvement at all, verification procedures are meant to be applied in situations 
where the Dutch legislator delegates regulatory power to a lower rule-maker (in this case the government 
and/or the Ministers concerned).139 Though based on no or limited parliamentary involvement, these 
procedures do not weaken democratic legitimacy generally as they only serve to verify whether the 
lower rule-maker adheres to the main elements of state policy as defined by the legislator in the 
preceding statute.140 Key to the new legislative approach, however, is that, as noted earlier, the draft-
                                                     
134  California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass”n v. Midcal Aluminium, Inc., 445 U.S. 389, 410 (1978).  
135  This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that initiators are required to submit evidence of sector support 
which increases the likelihood of horizontal coordination. Also, if the government introduces changes to the 
original initiative, additional initiator approval is required. Clearly, “initiatives” carry more weight than their 
title suggests. 
136  Minister of Economic Affairs, Explanatory notes to the legislative proposal, op. cit. supra note 11, para 4.2. In 
addition, ACM will advise on the effect-analyses petitioners have to submit on sustainability, price and other 
consumer considerations. 
137  Minister of Economic Affairs, Letter to Parliament, op. cit. supra note 11. 
138  Minister of Economic Affairs, Legislative proposal, op. cit. supra note 11, Art. 7. 
139  Notice from the Prime-Minister, Instructions for rule-making (Circulaire van de Minister-President van 18 
november 1992), Instruction 2.35, https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0005730/2018-01-01 (last visited 13 Dec. 
2018). The draft-Statute is based on one of four delegation methods – controlled delegation (Instruction 2.36).  
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delegation of regulatory power to a lower rule-maker, the delegating statute contains at least the main elements 
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and rules that may have to be issued urgently. The explanation by Instruction 2.35 provides that the reason for 
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statute does not define any such main elements at all.141 This means that, absent full “originator” 
parliamentary involvement, declaratory regulations are based on no or limited “concluder” 
parliamentary involvement. Lacking democratic legitimacy, they will thus fail to constitute sovereign 
state measures.  
The result is that the useful effect doctrine will apply after all. Given that this doctrine extends to national 
competition agencies that have a duty to disapply national legislation contravening EU competition 
law,142 “green coalitions” should therefore not trust to escape antitrust accountability.143 
5.3. Is the useful effect doctrine in need of repair? 
Lack of sovereignty brings us to the scholarly proposition that the useful effect doctrine needs to be 
updated. Schepel submitted earlier that, by focusing on procedural responsibility rather than substantive 
outcome, the delegation test erroneously overlooks that the “appropriate demand is for “public-
regarding” regulation, not for public regulation”.144 In the same vein, Monti and Mulder recently 
proposed the ECJ to follow the lead of the legitimate objective doctrine and move away from 
“conventional state centred understandings of dominium and imperium”, and develop “basic conditions 
for input and output legitimacy within new governance processes”.145 This proposition builds on several 
misunderstandings.  
First, the delegation prong of the useful effect doctrine rightly focuses on procedural responsibility/input 
legitimacy of a regulatory measure because it only serves to determine which mechanism must be used 
to check on substantive outcome/output legitimacy – the free movement or the competition rules. 
Second, Wouters does not evidence any shortcomings of a conventional understanding of dominium and 
imperium. By contrast, the ECJ appears to have underlined the timeless validity thereof when observing 
that Member States are free to opt for state or for market action, provided that either action option 
triggers accountability under the free movement or the competition rules.146 Third, the legitimate 
objective doctrine as originally applied in Wouters does not apply a more substantive approach but again 
focuses on procedural responsibility/input legitimacy. On the one hand, the legitimate objective doctrine 
builds on originator state responsibility in terms of public mandate and publicly defined objective in 
order to preclude private accountability for anticompetitive effects for which the state is actually 
responsible. On the other hand, this doctrine uses the ancillarity test, which, failing concluder state 
responsibility for subsequent regulation specified by market actors, serves to establish whether the state 
or the market is responsible for the anticompetitive effects of such regulation.  
                                                     
limited parliamentary involvement in situations of delegated regulatory power is to prevent a repetition of the 
preceding political decision-making process.  
141  Note that the list of “subject-matters”, yet to be specified by the government in general regulatory measures, is 
also unlikely to provide democratic legitimacy as parliament will not be involved. 
142  Case C-198/01, CIF, EU:C:2003:430. 
143  Note that ACM has issued new enforcement guidelines for sustainability agreements (Duurzaamheid en 
concurrentie. Uitgangspunten toezicht ACM op duurzaamheidsafspraken), 2 December 2016, 
https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/16673/ACM-stelt-uitgangspunten-vast-voor-toezicht-
duurzaamheidsafspraken-en-mededinging  (last visited 13 Dec. 2018). The main principle of the new 
guidelines is that the cartel prohibition will not be enforced if (sector-wide) sustainability agreements are 
supported by the government and by organizations representing citizens and business. Thus, it is not self-
evident that the competition agency will warrant the useful effect of the competition rules. 
144  Schepel, op. cit. supra note 127, at 49. 
145  Monti and Mulder, op. cit. supra note 2, at 656. Based on the reference note 93, dominium and imperium should 
be understood to reflect the realm of private interests versus the realm of public interests. “Input legitimacy” 
refers to the legitimacy of the procedure by which the public interest is defended, while “output legitimacy” 
refers to the legitimacy of the result (at 652). 
146  Case 309/99, Wouters, para 67-69. 
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It follows that strict adherence to the useful effect doctrine does not improperly hamper “innovative non-
State structures of governance”. If anything, the above discussion shows that there is a need for the ECJ 
to clarify the legitimate objective doctrine in order for it to serve its constitutional purpose in a functional 
manner and to avoid further confusion.   
5.4. Conclusion on the fourth flexible enforcement policy  
The fourth flexibility policy misreads the purpose and workings of the useful effect doctrine. In line with 
a binary institutional balance, this doctrine warrants that regulatory measures only escape antitrust 
accountability if based on proper state action. The new legislative approach will not yield proper state 
action. On the one hand, the delegating statute fails to define the main elements of state policy as a result 
of which declaratory regulations lack originator state responsibility. On the other hand, limited 
parliamentary involvement in the determination of declaratory regulations precludes sovereignty. This 
outcome does not signal a need for change of the useful effect doctrine. A focus on procedural 
responsibility does not obstruct innovative governance structures, but only warrants that those structures 
are not used to improperly escape antitrust accountability which after all serves to protect the general 
(sustainability) interest. 
6. Conclusion 
The above analysis shows that strict competition enforcement is the way forward, also to promote SCP. 
It turns out that none of the flexible enforcement policies meets the constitutional fundamentals of EU 
competition law. Those fundamentals do not allow for a broad welfare standard, but mandate a consumer 
surplus standard to check on most efficient use. Nor do they allow for a balancing of competition and 
non-competition interests like sustainability. Instead, they mandate the prioritization of the public 
competition interest over the general sustainability interest and objective law enforcement. In order to 
be effective, competition enforcement should be strict as market competition is the mechanism that 
pushes the market to engage in SCP and maximize sustainability. In order to be legitimate, competition 
enforcement should be strict as each of the evidentiary requirements of the cost-benefit analysis provided 
by Article 101(1) and (3) TFEU is functional to secure that market action actually maximizes 
sustainability. Problems of under-regulation are to be addressed by the regulatory state and require 
proper articulation of state policy in order to preclude antitrust accountability. In short, the cartel 
prohibition provides a straightforward accountability mechanism that serves to protect rather than 
hamper SCP. In order to use it properly, current practice needs to be amended. The Commission should 
consider to expressly reject CECED and qNWG enforcement policy and clarify the purpose and 
workings of the competition conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU. The ECJ should consider to correct the 
Meca-Medina widening of the legitimate objective doctrine introduced in Wouters.  
 
 
  
 
